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The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper uses Australian data from two national random surveys to show that citizens’ 
ratings of their tax authority’s performance on adhering to the principles of a Taxpayers’ 
Charter provide useful information for assessing the level of resistance-cooperation that 
the Tax Office is generating in the community through its administration of the tax system. 
As predicted, the ratings that people gave were affected by factors outside the narrow 
understanding of service delivery. This paper argues that the breadth of influence on 
Charter ratings strengthens rather than limits their usefulness because to understand a 
decline in ratings, tax authorities must engage in a degree of introspection that takes 
account of the overall integrity of the tax system. The central hypothesis that was 
confirmed in this study was that while Charter performance plays a role in eliciting 
cooperation and containing resistance once a partnership between a tax authority and 
taxpayer has been established, it does little to improve relationships when taxpayers have 
moved beyond the psychological or legal reach of the authority. 
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Are taxpayers’ charters ‘seducers’ or ‘protectors’ of public interest? Australia’s 
experience 
 
Valerie Braithwaite 
 
This paper explores empirically the significance of a taxpayers’ charter to citizens. 
Because taxation is an institution that involves the collection of revenue and redistribution 
of resources, charters for taxpayers have been viewed with some scepticism as 
performance indicators for the delivery of services (Milakovich, 2003). The question asked 
has been how reasonable is it to assess performance in terms of citizen satisfaction with a 
branch of government that relates to the public primarily in terms of ‘taking’ rather than 
‘giving’? Taxpayers’ charters thus have come to occupy contested ground. They have 
attracted both a ‘rights’ interpretation with a view to the protection of taxpayers (Bentley, 
1998a; 1998b, 1998c; Coppinger, 1989; Goldstein, 1989), along with a ‘service’ 
interpretation with a view to socially responsive performance (Bentley, 1998a, 1998b, 
1998c; Conference Board of Canada, 1998; Lamb, Tuck & Hoskin, 2003).  
 
As policy scholars debate the relative merits of charters as ‘seducers’ or ‘protectors’ of 
public interest, the question arises of the subjective meaning of a taxpayers’ charter to 
taxpayers. Do taxpayers reciprocate cooperation when they see a tax authority abiding by 
its charter? Or are tax authorities simply giving their adversaries a weapon for challenge or 
retaliation against past injustice? These are the questions addressed in this paper. 
 
The rise in popularity of taxpayers’ charters 
 
Increasingly for many people, taxpaying belongs to the category of a voluntary 
contribution that is made to support the governance of states and federations (Brooks, 
1998; Leadbeater, 1998; Mumford, 2002; Tomkins, Packman, Russell & Colville, 2001; 
Wolf, 2000). Along with this recognition has come a change in regulatory style. Tax 
authorities have started to expand their regulatory discourse beyond deterrence to regard 
taxpayers as partners in an on-going cooperative relationship (Bentley, 1998a; Lamb et al., 
2003; Conference Board of Canada, 1998; IRS Customer Service Task Force, 1997; ATO 
Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). To do this, they have adopted the nomenclature of the 
market place, regarding taxpayers as ‘clients’ or ‘customers’ who can be moved toward 
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compliant behaviour through judicious ‘marketing’ (Coleman & Freeman, 1997; Lamb et 
al., 2003; Prebble, 2001). Tax authorities around the world are investing heavily to 
‘personalise’ services and make it ‘simpler’ and ‘easier’ to comply (ATO Commissioner of 
Taxation, 2002-03; Conference Board of Canada, 1998; Office of Public Affairs, 2002). As 
part of this change, taxpayers’ charters and bills of rights have become popular, setting out 
how taxpayers can expect to be treated by tax authorities and giving a positive message 
about the mutual benefits of establishing a cooperative relationship (Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration, OECD, 2003).  
 
These developments have taken place against broader forces for public service reform that 
have generated interest in charters as symbols of consumer interests and citizen rights 
(Hood, 1991; Rhodes, 1994). Within a broader shake-up of the delivery of public services, 
tax authorities had reason to feel particularly vulnerable. Not only did they display the 
opaque, unresponsive and impersonal qualities of most enforcement oriented 
bureaucracies, but also they attracted criticism for what some saw as excessive powers that 
could be used unscrupulously against citizens (Joint Committee of Public Accounts Report, 
1993; McLennan, 2003; National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue 
Service, 1997). To make matters worse, in a rapidly globalising world, tax authorities have 
struggled with outmoded templates for decision-making, narrow, stovepipe focused 
outcomes and cumbersome tax law, giving little assurance that the extraordinary powers 
will be used only in the name of fair and reasonable administration (Freeman, 2002; IRS 
Customer Service Task Force, 1997; McCracken, 2002; Sparrow, 2000). Individual 
taxpayers fear how tax authorities may unfairly and unreasonably undermine their 
advancement (Bentley, 1994, 1995; Office of Public Affairs, 2002). It is, therefore, neither 
surprising nor inappropriate that charters and bills of rights for taxpayers have moved 
beyond a concern with ‘service standards’ to come under the umbrella of human rights 
more generally (Baker, 2000; James et al., 2004; McCracken, 2002).  
 
Which message is communicated to the public through taxpayer charters – taxpayer-tax 
office interdependence or individual protection – varies across jurisdictions. In the United 
Kingdom, the rights rhetoric has been downplayed (James et al., 2004; Williams, 1998) in 
favour of service standards and complaints mechanisms, or more specifically Codes of 
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Practice (see www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk). The Canada Revenue Agency has straddled the 
service and rights discourses through adopting a code that emphasises ‘fairness through 
service’ (Canada Revenue Agency, 2003a, 2003b). Other countries such as the United 
States have placed a rights discourse at the forefront, and with revisions of their bill of 
rights have enhanced the powers of taxpayer advocates (IRS Customer Service Task Force, 
1997). Australia has adopted a hybrid of the rights-services discourses.  
 
The relative merits of taxpayer rights have ignited debate. Many scholars are critical of the 
degree to which taxpayers’ charters can adequately protect individual rights (Bentley, 
1998a; Italia, 2001; James et al., 2004). Italia (2001) has argued that if individuals are 
seeking protection, they are best to look beyond the tax domain for a declaration of human 
rights in their nation’s constitution. On the other hand, taxpayer rights are regarded by 
some as weakening the efficiency of the tax authority to collect taxes. Charters and bills of 
rights provide a foothold for those wishing to challenge a tax authority (Greenbaum, 1998; 
James et al., 2004; McLennan, 2003). In particular, game playing with tax law (McBarnet 
and Whelan, 1999) can be aided by charters. Elements of the charters may be called into 
play to postpone hearings or derail legal procedures with the express purpose of avoiding a 
tax decision. While these issues are being debated by scholars, few question the 
supposition that taxpayers’ charters have the capacity to improve the authority’s 
relationship with taxpayers (Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD, 2003). 
Whether or not this is actually the case has, until now, attracted little empirical attention. 
Nevertheless, the assertion gains credibility from a substantial body of research linking 
perceptions of how authorities treat citizens to subsequent cooperation and compliance, 
particularly in regard to the practice of procedural justice (Tyler, 1990; Braithwaite, 1995). 
It is to this literature that we now turn. 
 
A theoretical framework for examining charters as vehicles for relationship building 
 
By relationship is meant a connection between two entities – be those entities individuals, 
groups, organizations or abstract entities – such that what is true of one has a bearing on, 
influences or is relevant to another. In the social sciences, this general understanding of 
relationship gives rise to a range of analytic paradigms that vary with discipline. When we 
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refer to a relationship between citizen and government we may be referring to a literature 
that explores what this connection ought to be – who should be doing what for whom. 
Distinct from this normative account is a formal description of how entities are connected, 
perhaps from a legal perspective, or perhaps from a social role perspective. In each case, 
insights are collected through the observation of events and the analysis of data that details 
actions and reactions. A third approach, and the one that frames the use of relationships in 
this research, is perceptual or subjective, one that interprets events through the eyes of the 
beholder. How we see other entities, how we interpret their motives and actions, and how 
we make sense of our engagement with them shapes the ways in which each of us responds 
(Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918). Nowhere is this more apparent than in the domain of 
taxation (Alm, Sanchez & Juan, 1995; Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998). 
 
Within the regulatory context, the emotional and social cognitive stance that people take in 
response to the actions of an authority have been referred to as motivational postures 
(Braithwaite, 1995, 2001, 2003a; Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Gibson & Makkai, 1994; ATO 
Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). These postures are public signals of the degree of social 
distance that individuals want to place between themselves and the authority. In turn, 
authorities are able to monitor the social rift developing between themselves, as 
supposedly legitimate regulators of human conduct, and their constituents who, as 
individuals or as groups, can respond through giving or withholding respect and 
cooperation. 
 
Two dimensions have been identified as underlying these motivational postures or the 
ways in which taxpayers engage with tax authorities (Braithwaite, 2001, 2004). The first 
dimension is called cooperation –resistance and represents the degree of liking in the 
relationship between the taxpayer and the tax authority. One end of the dimension is 
defined by positive affect and positive engagement with the tax system in terms of goals 
and processes, the other is defined by negativity and suspicion toward the authority.  
 
The second dimension called dissociation represents freedom from control by the tax 
authority. Dissociation is expressed in one or two ways. Taxpayers may disengage from 
the system, withdrawing to the point where they don’t care what the authority does to 
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them. Or, taxpayers may transcend the power differential, and enter the system as a worthy 
opponent, game playing with the authority through finding loopholes and challenging legal 
interpretation. Either way, taxpayers refuse to engage with the tax authority on its terms. 
 
Social psychologists have produced a body of work that leads to predictions about how the 
performance of a tax authority on its charter or bill of rights might flow on to affect 
taxpayer’s willingness to cooperate or accept authority. Charters prescribe the processes to 
which authorities adhere in order to deliver procedural justice to constituents (Braithwaite 
& Reinhart, 2001). The major elements of procedural justice were defined broadly by 
Leventhal (1980) as including both objective structural issues and subjective evaluations in 
the following domains: the selection of rule makers and arbiters, processes for setting 
ground rules, processes for gathering information, processes for using information to make 
decisions, processes for appealing decisions, and processes for considering and bringing 
about change. Although charters for taxpayers do not cover all these areas, they refer to 
most of them in order to inform citizens of what they can expect in their dealings with the 
authority. 
 
The perception that an authority adheres to the principles of procedural justice has emerged 
as one of the major determinants of cooperation and compliance with authority in a range 
of settings (Tyler, 1990, 1997). Yet the effects of procedural justice are not uniformly 
strong. Procedural justice overcomes the desire for favourable personal outcomes 
(distributive justice) when individuals define themselves as members of the regulator-
regulatee community. When individuals define themselves as being outside such a 
community, the degree to which procedural justice elicits cooperation and compliance is 
greatly reduced (Tyler & Degoey, 1995). In light of these findings, we predict that 
taxpayers who perceive the tax authority adhering to charter principles will be more likely 
to cooperate with a tax authority. Perceptions of high charter performance, however, will 
do little to break down the resolve of those who have dissociated from the system. 
 
Procedural justice is the essence of taxpayers’ charters. Scholars who are concerned to 
define principles of good governance, however, would be quick to point out that where 
governments lead their citizens is every bit as important as how they lead them. On this 
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basis, some would question whether or not it is particularly important to monitor ratings of 
charter performance. A broader perspective that takes account of fairness and 
reasonableness of outcomes as well as process has been referred to elsewhere as integrity 
(Selznick, 1992). Tax system integrity has been defined as connectedness in goals and 
objectives, soundness of purpose, and processes that reflect on and evolve that purpose in 
response to community needs (Braithwaite, 2003b). Integrity is much broader in its scope 
than procedural justice, but the concepts are related. Procedural justice is part of, but not all 
of integrity. And integrity would not be possible without procedural justice. 
 
While the link exists in theory, the question remains of whether taxpayers make this link. 
This paper therefore has a second objective: To look for the determinants of why people 
rate the tax authority on charter principles as they do. Do the ratings serve narrow self-
interest by reflecting personal experiences of fortunate or unfortunate outcomes with the 
Tax Office, do they reflect endorsement of the purposes and goals of the tax authority, or 
do they simply reflect what they are purported to represent – the extent to which tax 
authorities deal with taxpayers in a way that is respectful of their rights? 
 
The major concerns of this paper, therefore, are twofold: (a) what kinds of relationships 
can be built through charters; and (b) what drives the ratings that citizens give tax 
authorities on charters? Before addressing these questions, the basic issue of measuring a 
tax authority’s performance on a taxpayers’ charter will be discussed, using Australia’s 
Taxpayers’ Charter as a case study for empirical analysis. 
 
Research context: Australia’s Taxpayers’ Charter 
 
How a charter is working is unavoidably context bound, shaped by the tax system in which 
it operates (Bentley, 1995; Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD, 2003; 
Mumford, 2002). This paper relies on data evaluating the Australian Taxation Office’s 
(Tax Office) Taxpayers’ Charter and collected through two national surveys in 2000 and 
2001-2. Given that so little empirical data is available on what people make of their 
charters, it seems reasonable to tolerate a degree of parochialism in a bid to map out the 
research territory of their use. The conceptual framework and hypotheses hopefully can be 
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transported elsewhere to go some way toward meeting the challenge set down by Tomkins, 
Packman, Russell & Colville (2001) to better understand the management of tax regimes.  
 
The Tax Office Charter launched in 1997 covered taxpayer rights, service standards, 
avenues of redress, and taxation obligations. The commitments that the tax authority made 
to the public, in relation to formal Tax Office communications and decisions as well as 
interpersonal encounters, were captured through 12 principles. In 2003, the Charter was 
reviewed and extended to 13 principles, selecting out as a separate principle, the right to 
make a complaint (see (k) below). The new Charter also features slightly modified 
wording and explanations to clarify the meaning of the principles. The 13 principles are: 
(a) treat you fairly and reasonably; (b) treat you as being honest in your tax affairs unless 
you act otherwise; (c) offer you professional service and assistance to help you understand 
and meet your tax obligations; (d) accept you can be represented by a person of your 
choice and get advice about your tax affairs; (e) respect your privacy; (f) keep the 
information we hold about you confidential in accordance with the law; (g) give you access 
to information we hold about you in accordance with the law; (h) give you advice and 
information you can rely on; (i) explain to you the decisions we make about your tax 
affairs; (j) respect your right to a review; (k) respect your right to make a complaint; (l) 
administer the tax system in a way that minimises your costs of compliance; and (m) be 
accountable for what we do.  
 
These principles subsume the OECD’s guidelines for the development of a taxpayers’ 
charter (Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD, 2003). The OECD’s Committee 
of Fiscal Affairs (1990) identified six rights which they concluded were commonly 
recognized among OECD countries: (a) the right to be informed, assisted and heard; (b) the 
right of appeal; (c) the right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax; (d) the right to 
certainty; (e) the right to privacy; (f) the right to confidentiality and secrecy. These rights 
aim to protect the taxpayer from the inappropriate use of power by the tax authority.  
 
In addition, Australia’s Taxpayers’ Charter follows a number of other countries (in 
particular, Canada and the UK) in extending the rights discourse to encompass quality 
service. For analytic purposes, Bentley (1998b) differentiates legal rights from 
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administrative rights in the Charter. He describes ‘third order administrative rights’ as 
those representing the tax authority’s aspirations to abide by rules of social etiquette, 
principles that may be important for relationship building but that do not have legal 
standing. In effect, the Charter acknowledges rights that empower the taxpayer, and at the 
same time commits the tax authority to action that is respectful of these rights. It is as if the 
tax authority is saying to taxpayers: ‘We know you have these rights, but you will not have 
to demand them, we will act in ways that honour them.’ Through providing taxpayers with 
expectations that the Tax Office will be fair and reasonable, treat taxpayers as honest, 
respect privacy, honour confidentiality, and be accountable, an agenda is signalled that is 
proactive in building a cooperative relationship with the public.  
 
Thus, the Charter explicitly combines principles that respect the taxpayers’ right to be 
protective in relation to their own wellbeing – they remind taxpayers of the powers they 
have as individuals – along with principles that signal the authority’s interest in a 
partnership. Through these principles, Australia’s Taxpayers’ Charter meets, in theory, its 
objective of ‘outlining the relationship we seek with the community – a relationship based 
on mutual trust and respect’ (Commissioner’s Foreword, Australian Taxation Office, 
2003). The next question is how can performance on the Charter be measured in order to 
empirically test the practical realities of whether or not people see themselves in a 
relationship with the tax authority. 
 
1. METHOD OF EVALUATING CHARTER PERFORMANCE 
 
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the focus here is on the subjective evaluations 
of how the Tax Office is performing on the Charter. Subjective assessments should not be 
construed as replacements for more objective assessments that involve audits of response 
times to taxpayer requests, checks on the accuracy of the advice given, or reviews of 
appeals processes (see for example, United States General Accounting Office, 1998). 
Perceptions are important in their own right, however, because if individuals do not believe 
that tax authorities comply with their charters, then an essential part of the argument 
causally linking the actions of the tax authority to levels of cooperation from the taxpaying 
population is absent. In order for taxpayers to reciprocate in the form of cooperative, 
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respectful and reasonable actions, they must perceive the tax authority’s actions as such. 
 
The data used for evaluating the Charter were collected by the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity (Braithwaite, 2001; Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns & Graham, 2001) at the 
Australian National University through two random national surveys: The Community 
Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey (CHFAS) and the Australian Tax System: Fair or Not 
Survey (ATSFONS). The first survey, CHFAS, was conducted between June and 
December 2000, and was a tax omnibus designed to collect baseline data on how 
Australia’s tax system was faring at the time of the introduction of the GST. A sample of 
7754 randomly selected citizens from the publicly available electoral rolls received a 
questionnaire and reply paid envelope. Reminders were sent at varying intervals over the 
following six months to those with whom we had had no contact. Included in this process 
was a mail out with a new questionnaire after five weeks. In all, 2040 questionnaires were 
collected for analysis. The response rate, after adjusting for out-of-scope respondents (no 
longer at the address or deceased), was 29%. While low in comparison with other surveys, 
this response rate is consistent with other research reports based on single topic tax surveys 
(Kirchler, 1999; Pope, Fayle & Chen, 1993; Wallschutzky, 1996; Webley, Adams & 
Elffers, 2002). Detailed analyses of early versus late respondents and comparisons with 
census data on social demographic indicators suggested that the sample provided a 
relatively representative cross-section of the Australian population. Underrepresented were 
young males and over-represented were those in scribing occupations (see Mearns & 
Braithwaite, 2001, for details on the methodology and the sampling). 
 
Between November 2001 and February 2002, the second survey, ATSFONS, was 
conducted. This survey mainly comprised a subset of the CHFAS questions with some 
additions including attitudes to the GST and tax avoidance. The prime purpose of this 
survey was to track changes in attitudes to the tax system. The main sample therefore 
comprised respondents to the 2000 survey. In order to strengthen the methodology of the 
study and test for further sources of sample bias, the ATSFONS was also sent to two other 
groups: (a) a new sample of 3000 citizens selected from the electoral roll and (b) a sample 
of 2000 CHFAS non-respondents, chosen randomly from the portion of the CHFAS 
sample who neither accepted nor declined our invitation to take part. For the purposes of 
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the present paper, we will restrict ourselves to the 1161 CHFAS respondents who were 
successfully followed up and who completed the ATSFONS. The retention rate was 69%. 
 
Measuring Charter performance 
 
The procedure used to evaluate the Taxpayers’ Charter was identical across surveys. 
Respondents were asked to use a five point rating scale ranging from almost never (1) to 
almost always (5) to answer the question: Do you think that the Tax Office acts in 
accordance with the [Taxpayers’ Charter] standards set out below? The original 12 
principles (all except k above) were then listed and respondents had to assess each of them 
in turn using the scale that was provided. 
 
Initial analyses of these data showing the degree to which the population endorsed the tax 
authority’s performance on each of these standards have been reported in detail elsewhere 
(Braithwaite & Reinhart, 2000; James et al. 2004). Social-demographic differences on 
Charter ratings are relatively minor, thus justifying the aggregated responses reported 
below. The percentages reporting that the tax authority acted in accordance with the 
Charter ‘most times’ or ‘almost always’ for 2000 and 2001-2 are presented in Table 1. The 
Charter principles appear in descending order from the principle most consistently 
honoured in 2000 to the principle that was least often honoured. Thus, being treated as 
honest, having the freedom to seek an advisor, and having confidentiality and privacy 
respected were areas in which the Tax Office performed well in the eyes of the public. 
Less praise was directed at the Tax Office in terms of consistently being accountable and 
helping to minimise costs.  
 
In general, the performance of the Tax Office on the principles dropped between 2000 and 
2001-2. James et al., (2004) have documented a statistically significant difference in 
taxpayer ratings from the CHFAS to the ATSFONS for 8 of the 12 standards, a finding that 
they suggest may be due to up-beat Australian sentiment about the tax system prior to the 
introduction of the Goods-and-Services Tax (GST). The government engaged in an 
extensive advertising campaign to launch the GST as part of a new and fairer tax system 
(Media Watch, 2004).  
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Table 1: The percentage of Australians who considered the Tax Office acting in 
accordance with Charter principles most times or almost always 
 
Charter principles  % 
’00 
% 
’02 
Treating you as honest in your tax affairs  74 66 
Accepting your right to get advice from a person of your choice  72 63 
Keeping information confidential 71 69 
Respecting your privacy  62 61 
Treating you fairly and reasonably  62 52 
Giving you access to information they hold about you  61 51 
Offering you professional service and assistance  56 51 
Explaining decisions about your tax affairs 53 49 
Giving you advice and information that you can rely on  53 48 
Giving you the right to an outside review  51 41 
Being accountable for what they do  46 41 
Helping to minimise your compliance costs  36 32 
 
Are there other explanations for the drop in ratings? 
 
The generality of the drop in ratings (across virtually all the standards) supports this 
interpretation, but there are differences in how much particular standards dropped in 
comparison to others, and these differences may be explained by an additional factor. The 
standards that displayed the most dramatic drop from 2000 to 2001-2 are being treated as 
honest, being treated fairly and reasonably, the right to seek advice from a person of one’s 
choice, the right to an external review, and the right to have access to information about 
oneself.  
 
Between the surveys, the Tax Office was publicly engaged in conflict with taxpayers who 
had become involved in mass marketed tax effective schemes (see Murphy 2003a, 2003b, 
2004a, 2004b for a detailed analysis of this conflict). These schemes had been widely 
promoted in the community during the 1990s as effective tax minimization strategies under 
Australia’s self-assessment system. In 1998, the Tax Office concluded that the tax 
deductions claimed through these schemes were in breach of the anti-avoidance provisions 
of Part IVA of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and issued amended tax 
assessments with interest and penalties going back six years. The result was that many 
investors found themselves in debt to the Tax Office for very large sums of money. 
According to Murphy (2003b), ‘in October 2001 – three and a half years after amended 
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assessments had been issued – more than 50% of scheme investors had still refused to 
enter into settlement arrangements with the Tax Office to pay back their tax debts’           
(p. 384). 
 
In addition to the financial burden, taxpayers were humiliated in the media frenzy 
surrounding the event with labels such as ‘tax cheat’ (Murphy, 2003b). Taxpayers 
challenged the Tax Office on the grounds that they had consulted tax advisors before 
investing in the schemes. The conflict between the Tax Office and the taxpayers and their 
advisors escalated to the point where a Senate Inquiry was held, ‘Inquiry into Mass 
Marketed Tax Effective Schemes and Investor Protection: Final Report’ (Senate 
Economics References Committee, 2002). The Inquiry was critical of the Tax Office’s 
delay in warning the public about the questionable legitimacy of the schemes for tax 
minimization purposes. Furthermore, Murphy (2004b) concluded on the basis of survey 
research with these investors, that a strong case could be made for linking taxpayer 
resistance to settlement with perceptions of procedural injustice at the hands of the Tax 
Office. The Charter elements of being treated as honest, fairly and reasonably, of having 
an independent advisor and an external review were all present in the mass marketed 
schemes controversy and are among the standards that drop most markedly between 2000 
and 2001-2. These results provide some face validity for the proposition that national 
survey evaluations of Tax Office performance on the Taxpayers’ Charter reflect the 
public’s response to controversial actions by that authority. 
 
2. WHAT KINDS OF RELATIONSHIPS ARE BUILT THROUGH A CHARTER? 
 
Explaining cooperation-resistance and dissociation 
 
This section of the paper examines the empirical relationships between respondents’ 
ratings of Tax Office performance on the Charter in 2000 and their inclination to cooperate 
with or dissociate from the system in 2001-2. The analyses are of three kinds. First, 
bivariate correlations are examined to answer the question, how well does adherence to a 
specific principle relate to cooperation-resistance and dissociation? Next, regression 
analyses are used to address the question of which of these 12 principles are the best 
predictors of cooperation-resistance and dissociation. Finally, regression analyses are used 
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again but with a slightly different question: When people change their levels of 
cooperation-resistance or dissociation between 2000 and 2001-2, which specific principles 
account for that change? Are some more important than others?  
 
Bivariate correlations between specific Charter principles and cooperation–resistance 
and dissociation 
 
Initially, the Charter ratings were correlated with the scales that had been developed to 
measure cooperation-resistance and dissociation (see Appendix for scales). These results 
are presented in Table 2. All of the Charter principles were positively related to 
cooperation-resistance 18 months later. Those who believed that the Tax Office performed 
well on the Charter principles were more likely to express a cooperative stance toward the 
Tax Office in the future.  
 
Table 2: The extent to which ratings of Tax Office performance on each Charter 
principle in 2000 correlates with self-reported levels of cooperation-resistance and 
dissociation in 2001-2 
 
Charter principles  r 
cooperation 
r 
dissociation 
Treating you as honest in your tax affairs  0.37*** -0.13*** 
Accepting your right to get advice from a person of your 
choice  
0.29*** -0.13*** 
Keeping information confidential 0.28*** -0.03 
Respecting your privacy  0.32*** 0.00 
Treating you fairly and reasonably  0.42*** -0.10*** 
Giving you access to information they hold about you  0.27*** -0.02 
Offering you professional service and assistance  0.30*** -0.04 
Explaining decisions about your tax affairs 0.34*** -0.04 
Giving you advice and information that you can rely on  0.35*** -0.04 
Giving you the right to an outside review  0.29*** -0.04 
Being accountable for what they do  0.37*** -0.09** 
Helping to minimise your compliance costs  0.36*** 0.01 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The relationships between Charter ratings and dissociation were far less impressive. 
Indeed, one could say that the prediction of dissociation from Charter ratings was dismal. 
The links that did emerge showed dissociation as being somewhat higher in 2001-2 among 
those who, in 2000, gave the Tax Office a relatively lower rating on treating taxpayers as 
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honest, fair and reasonable, as being accountable, and respecting the right to have an 
advisor.  
 
Using regression analysis to predict cooperation–resistance and dissociation 
 
A second analysis sought to quantify the observation that cooperation-resistance could be 
predicted quite well from Charter ratings whereas dissociation could not, and to ask the 
question, which principles were doing most of the work in predicting cooperative or 
dissociative behaviour? Stepwise multiple regression analysis was used to identify those 
Charter principles that could be considered the best subset of predictors of cooperation–
resistance in the first instance, and then dissociation. Because the Charter principles have 
been found to intercorrelate very highly, it was likely that some Charter principles would 
dominate others in the regression model. A stepwise procedure, therefore, was preferred to 
a model that contained the full set of variables. In this way, a ‘short list’ of principles that 
were critically important in this situation could be identified.  
 
The beta coefficients for the variables that were entered into the regression model as 
significant predictors are reported under Model 1 in Table 3. Five Charter principles 
dominated the analysis predicting cooperation-resistance: treating taxpayers as honest, 
giving fair and reasonable treatment, being accountable, respecting privacy, and 
minimizing compliance costs. Together they accounted for 22% of the variation in 
cooperation-resistance scores. These findings suggest that from the perspective of the Tax 
Office, meeting community expectations on these five key Charter principles in 2000 
would have been a worthwhile strategy for building community partnerships and avoiding 
communities of resistance in 2002. 
 
In the case of dissociation, the results under Model 1 in Table 3 reveal a different picture. 
The percentage of variation accounted for in dissociation was a low 4%. The best 
predictors among the Charter principles were being treated as honest, respecting the right 
to have an advisor, respecting privacy, and minimizing compliance costs. Not being treated 
as honest and not having the right to an advisor respected in 2000 predicted higher 
dissociation in 2001-2, as might be expected. But once these variables were controlled it 
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was a higher rating on respecting privacy and a higher rating on minimizing costs that 
predicted greater dissociation. These findings are weak in magnitude, but they add 
substance to concerns that have been expressed in relation to taxpayer rights: In the hands 
of some, in this case those who have dissociated from the system, rights may be seen as an 
opportunity to escape the obligations of the system (McLennan, 2003; James et al., 2004).  
 
Table 3: Predicting cooperation-resistance and dissociation from Charter principlesa  
 
 Beta coefficients 
 Cooperation Dissociation 
Charter principles Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Control for Time 1  0.58***  -0.58*** 
Treat you as honest in your tax affairs  0.12** 0.09** -0.16*** -0.07* 
Treat you fairly and reasonably  0.17***    
Be accountable for what they do  0.10**    
Respect your privacy  0.08*  -0.08*  
Help minimise compliance costs  0.13***  -0.11** -0.08** 
Respect right to get advice    -0.15*** -0.08** 
Explain decisions   0.07*   
Variation accounted for: Adjusted r2 0.22*** 0.44*** -0.04*** -0.37*** 
a The method of analysis used here is a hierarchical stepwise regression analysis. Initially, the Time 1 
measure of the dependent variable is entered into the regression model, but on the next series of steps, 
variables are entered into the model if they do the best job at improving the variance accounted for in 
the dependent variable and if the variance they add is significant. If there is no beta coefficient in the 
table for a particular principle, this means that the variable did not add significantly to the variance 
accounted for in the dependent variable.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Using regression analysis to predict change in cooperation–resistance and dissociation 
 
Model 1 in Table 3 describes the prediction of behaviours in 2001-2 (cooperation-
resistance and dissociation) from those in 2000 (Charter ratings). A more fine-grained 
analysis would ask if any of the Charter ratings measured in 2000 predict change in 
cooperation-resistance or change in dissociation from 2000 to 2001-2? Analytically, the 
change hypothesis can be tested through controlling for the scores that respondents 
obtained on cooperation-resistance in 2000 (when predicting cooperation-resistance in 
2001-2), and dissociation in 2000 (when predicting dissociation in 2001-2).  
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Regression Model 2 on the left in Table 3 involves entering cooperation-resistance in 2000 
into the regression model first, and on a subsequent step entering Charter principles in 
order to answer the question, which ones bring about the most change in cooperation-
resistance over this period. Two Charter principles are associated with change. Those who 
rated the tax authority poorly on treating taxpayers as honest and on giving an explanation 
for a tax decision became less cooperative and more resistant between 2000 and 2001-2. 
 
When the same analysis was conducted with dissociation, change was associated with 
three variables. Dissociation increased for those who reported failings by the Tax Office in 
treating people as honest and in respecting the right to have an advisor. Dissociation also 
increased among those who agreed that the Tax Office performed well at keeping taxpayer 
compliance costs to a minimum. Again, there is the suggestion that the Charter may 
become an aid to game playing among taxpayers who regard the Tax Office not as an 
authority, but as a competitor. 
 
Summary of what Charter ratings predict 
 
Together, these findings show that the ratings that citizens give to the Tax Office on the 
Taxpayers’ Charter can be thought of as a litmus test for future cooperation and resistance. 
These findings strengthen the interpretation of the Charter as a symbol of relationship 
building between the taxpayer and the Tax Office. Charter ratings tell us very little, 
however, about the growth and decline of dissociation. As expected, the Charter is less 
useful as a set of principles for bringing people back into an authority structure, once that 
authority has lost respect. The Charter works when there is a relationship in place – either 
resistant or cooperative between an authority and those it governs. It does not work well 
when that relationship has been severed. 
 
Within the context of this study, the single most important Charter principle was to be 
treated as ‘honest in your tax affairs.’ This principle predicted improved future 
cooperation-resistance and less dissociation, and contributed to explaining change in 
Charter ratings between 2000 and 2001-2. Thus, we find evidence of what Bentley 
(1998b) would refer to as ‘aspirational etiquette’ pushing out more legally grounded rights 
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as predictors of how individuals relate to the tax authority. 
 
Among the other predictors, it is of interest that principles such as fair and reasonable 
treatment, respect for privacy and help to minimise costs figured prominently as bridge 
builders for cooperation-resistance, but not dissociation. Rights discourse does little to 
improve relationships with the dissociated, except perhaps in the case of the right to be 
given independent advice and to have this advice respected. This principle was positively 
correlated with cooperation and negatively with dissociation. It also was shown to reduce 
dissociation across time. Within the world of taxation, taxpayers who have dissociated 
appear to be looking beyond the tax authority for leadership. 
 
3. WHAT FACTORS PREDISPOSE TAXPAYERS TO GIVE HIGHER AVERAGE 
CHARTER RATINGS? 
 
If Charter ratings are to be regarded as a credible source of feedback for a tax authority, it 
is important to understand the forces that shape them. All tax authorities would hope for a 
simple dynamic: If they implement the principles of the Charter diligently and 
consistently, their performance would be noticed and attract high rates of approval from 
taxpayers. It is this very dynamic, however, that creates fear in the hearts of those who 
wish mass publics would look more critically and participate more actively in their 
democracy. The nicety of policy implementation should not be allowed to drown out 
critical analysis of the substantive issues of policy direction. 
 
There is good reason to doubt whether the basis for Charter ratings is as simple as that just 
described. Rarely are our attitudes formed in a psychological and social vacuum. Other 
attitudes and beliefs exert their influence, shaping how we see our environment (Rokeach, 
1968, 1973). If we hold deeply entrenched attitudes and beliefs that are antagonistic to the 
Tax Office, our Charter ratings may be consistently on the low side, reflecting these 
negative preconceptions. Similarly, if our sense of identity is threatened by the Tax Office, 
we may be wary, if not blind, to Charter implementation that is designed to improve 
relations and build partnerships (see Allport, 1961 for an early discussion of how our 
attitudes are in the service of protecting our self-respect). 
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A set of factors considered likely triggers for antagonistic attitudes and threat to identity 
was identified from the tax compliance literature (Frey, 2003; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; 
Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Kirchler, 1999; Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Wenzel, 2002). Five 
possible determinants of Charter ratings were singled out for empirical analysis: (a) justice 
in making and delivering decisions (perceptions of distributive justice – obtaining 
outcomes that are favourable to the taxpayer – are pitted against perceptions of procedural 
justice – dealing with taxpayers in a respectful fashion and giving them representation); (b) 
experiences of trust or adversarialism in relation to the Tax Office; (c) endorsement of tax 
reform through the GST (both the reform, and its implementation); (d) deference to the tax 
authority; and (e) dissatisfaction with government. 
 
From the perspective of a tax authority, some of these influences are within its control, 
others are not. For instance, responses given through blind obedience will boost ratings and 
mask the detection of the authority’s performance failings. Dissatisfaction with 
government, in contrast, will depress performance ratings. Because they are outside the 
control of the tax authority itself, such influences might be conceived as ‘illegitimate’ and 
as limiting the usefulness of the ratings.  
 
From another equally valid perspective – the perspective of proponents of good 
governance – some influences reflect tax system integrity, others not. For instance, if 
Charter ratings dropped because taxpayers were audited – based on evidence of tax 
evasion – Charter ratings might again be considered too blunt an instrument for 
monitoring Tax Office performance. Again, the issue of an influence being ‘illegitimate’ 
enters our deliberations. While recognizing the point that the theoretical import of the 
variable needs to be discussed independently of empirical importance, we will postpone 
this discussion until later. The purpose of this section is to subject these various potential 
influences to empirical analysis. 
 
Relating five influences to an aggregate measure of Charter performance 
 
To represent the five types of influences, 10 variables were selected for further empirical 
analysis. They are listed in Table 4. Measurement details, unless otherwise specified, are 
 19
available in Braithwaite (2001). These 10 variables are related to a composite measure of 
Charter performance.  
 
The composite measure of Charter performance is obtained by averaging the ratings over 
the 12 principles for each individual, producing a single score ranging from 1 to 5. The 
justification for this procedure is that both factor analysis and internal consistency analysis 
point to the existence of one underlying dimension of how well the Tax Office performed 
in implementing and abiding by its Charter.  
 
Bivariate correlations between sources of influence and an aggregate measure of 
Charter performance 
 
When the averaged Charter scores in 2001-2 were correlated with the 10 hypothesized 
predictors from 2000, all correlations were statistically significant. The results are reported 
in the second column of Table 4. These findings show the complexity of Charter ratings in 
that they are related to a range of other attitudes and beliefs about government, the tax 
system and how the Tax Office is doing its job.  
 
If we focus on the magnitude of the correlation coefficients in Table 4, however, there is an 
indication that some factors are more important than others. High Charter performance 
was most strongly correlated with trust in the Tax Office and procedural justice. Taxpayers 
who believed that the Tax Office served the common good, acted impartially, and met its 
obligations gave higher ratings on the Charter. Similarly, taxpayers who regarded the Tax 
Office as having respect for citizens, consulting them and treating them as trustworthy, that 
is, as delivering procedural justice, were more likely to provide high Charter ratings. These 
very high correlations provide validity for the claim that Australia’s Taxpayers’ Charter is 
a document that describes the quality of the relationship between the tax authority and the 
taxpayer.  
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Table 4: Predicting average Charter ratings in 2001-2 from experiential and 
attitudinal measures taken in 2000 and predicting change using ordinary least 
squares regression analysis 
 
Predictors Correlation 
coefficients 
R 
Beta 
coefficients 
Model 1 
Beta 
coefficients 
Model 2 
Control for Time 1   0.34*** 
Deference     
Likelihood of getting caught  0.14*** 0.08** 0.07** 
Deference to Tax Office decisions a 0.12*** 0.00 0.00 
Dissatisfaction with government     
With services received for tax paid b -0.31*** -0.11*** -0.10*** 
With the way government spends 
taxpayers’ money  
-0.25*** 0.05 0.06 
Justice in the tax system (personal)    
Distributive justice 0.39*** 0.13*** 0.07* 
Procedural justice c 0.53*** 0.25*** 0.09* 
Responses to tax reform     
Agree with a goods-and-services tax d 0.18*** 0.02 0.02 
Helpful advice with GST e 0.30*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
Experiential variables    
Trust in the Tax Office 0.52*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 
Conflict with the Tax Office -0.12*** 0.01 0.01 
Adjusted r2  0.36*** 0.42*** 
a In an earlier publication, this scale was called obligation and appears as part of the legitimacy variables 
(Braithwaite, 2001). 
b This scale (M = 3.04, SD = 0.91, alpha = 0.42) comprises the average of responses to two items (a) Would 
you prefer to pay less tax even if it means receiving a more restricted range of goods and services? (b) Do 
you think the tax you pay is fair given the goods and services you get from the government? (reverse) ratings 
were given on a 1-5 strongly disagree to strongly agree scale. 
c The procedural justice scale (M = 3.00, SD = 0.68, alpha = 0.84) combined three scales that are part of the 
fairness measures in Braithwaite (2001): (a) respect; (b) trustworthy treatment; and (c) consultation. 
d Agreement with a goods-and-services tax (M = 2.62; SD = 0.95; alpha = 0.87) was measured by averaging 
the responses to these items: (a) The GST was a tax we had to have; (b) My standard of living now is just as 
high as it was before the GST; (c) Some goods and services should be exempted from the GST (reverse);    
(d) A GST is the best way to make sure that the government has enough money to run the country; (e) The 
GST has been hard on the most vulnerable members of the our community (reverse); (f) The GST has 
increased the gap between the rich and the poor in Australia (reverse); and (g) A tax on goods and services is 
a fair way of collecting the tax needed to run Australia. Responses were made on a 1-5 strongly disagree to 
strongly agree scale. 
e Recognizing helpful advice (M = 2.90; SD = 0.91; alpha = 0.77) was measured by averaging the responses 
to these items: (a) A lot of helpful information was given to the community about the GST; (b) The GST has 
had a smooth introduction, all things considered; (c) The advice that was offered to the community when the 
GST was introduced was poor (reverse); and (d) The Tax Office did its best to help us deal with the GST. 
Responses were made on a 1-5 strongly disagree to strongly agree scale. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Among the middle ranking correlations in Table 4 were providing help with the 
introduction of the GST and receiving Tax Office decisions that are favourable 
(distributive justice), both of which improved ratings; and being dissatisfied with 
government’s use of tax money and the public goods-for-tax exchange, both of which 
lowered ratings. These middle ranking correlations re-ignite concerns that Charter ratings 
may reflect irrelevant considerations and therefore are not useful benchmarks for assessing 
Tax Office performance. Somewhat more reassuring in this respect are the correlations 
associated with having conflict with the Tax Office, and being deferential to Tax Office 
authority. In both instances, the coefficients are low, suggesting that while taxpayers were 
somewhat influenced by these considerations, they were not swayed notably by them. 
Compared to other factors, subservience was not a major force shaping taxpayer 
evaluations, and taxpayers, surprisingly, were not blinded to a noteworthy degree by 
personal experiences of adversarialism or contestation. These data suggest that taxpayers 
accept and are mindful of the context in which they provide ratings of Charter 
performance: The tax authority is evaluated on terms that take into account its raison d’être 
– to collect the correct amount of tax from taxpayers in a manner that is fair and 
reasonable. 
 
Using regression analysis to predict Charter performance and change 
 
To provide a more rigorous comparative test of the importance of the 10 predictors in 
Table 4, two regression models were tested. The first model (Model 1 in Table 4) included 
all 10 variables measured in 2000 and used to predict Charter ratings in 2001-2. The 
second model (Model 2 in Table 4) predicted change in Charter scores from 2000 to 2001-
2 through adding the control variable of Charter scores in 2000. The variables that 
emerged as significant in these two models were the same. Most important was trust in the 
Tax Office, followed by helpfulness in introducing the GST and procedural justice. All of 
these factors predicted improved Charter performance. Less important, but nevertheless 
significant in improving Charter ratings were favourable Tax Office decisions, being 
satisfied with the services received for the taxes paid, and believing one was likely to get 
caught for wrong doing.  
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Charter ratings were influenced by a set of factors, not all of which were strictly relevant 
to abiding by the Charter. But the regression analyses also revealed that the predictors that 
stood out above and beyond others shared a common feature. They were relevant to 
evaluating the bigger picture of whether the tax system is working as it should. This bigger 
picture lines up surprisingly well with the concept of tax system integrity outlined earlier 
(Braithwaite, 2003b). 
 
Summary of what determines Charter ratings  
 
Average Charter ratings have been shown to vary with a number of factors, but the most 
important were (a) trust in the authority to act impartially and on behalf of all citizens and 
(b) procedural justice whereby taxpayers believed they were being treated as trustworthy, 
with respect, and included in deliberations about the future of the tax system. These 
determinants stood out above all others as capturing the essence of the Taxpayers’ Charter 
as conceived by the Tax Office. Also among the most important predictors of positive 
Charter ratings was recognition of helpfulness surrounding the introduction of the GST. 
The Charter appears to be sufficiently sensitive to reflect quality of service accompanying 
tax reform, regardless of the popularity of the reform itself.  
 
Perceptions of the chances of being caught boosted Charter ratings, while receiving 
unfavourable tax decisions and inadequate public services for tax paid depressed them. 
While not directly relevant to Charter performance per se, these factors are integral to 
evaluating how a tax system is performing overall. Should the community ever come to the 
view that they could never be caught for tax cheating, that Tax Office decisions were 
always unfavourable to them, and that taxes paid and services received were disconnected, 
the tax system and the democracy would be in a sorry state. For this reason, a case will be 
made below for concluding that these findings expand rather than limit the usefulness of 
Charter ratings. 
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4. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
To summarise the findings overall, the Charter is meaningful to Australians as a symbol of 
a partnership that they hold with the Tax Office. When Charter ratings are low, the 
community is resistant to the attempts of the tax authority to regulate their activities. When 
Charter ratings are high, the community is cooperative, possibly even acquiescent to tax 
authority demands. Dissociation is another matter. The Charter does relatively little to 
change the extent to which individuals have dissociated from the tax authority.  
 
With regard to the sources of Charter ratings, they are varied, but standing out in the field 
of competing influences is the core of procedural justice concerns – being treated with 
respect, as trustworthy, and being consulted in tax related issues – along with a 
reciprocated sense of trust in the tax authority as an impartial arbiter and servant of the 
public interest. 
 
The implications of these findings for the administration of tax regimes and governance 
more generally are three fold. First, they challenge us to consider the issue of the 
susceptibility of the public to being seduced into cooperation through fair and reasonable 
treatment without confronting problems surrounding overall objectives and purpose. The 
data analysed in this paper showed cooperation to be high, running at the 82% mark for 
2000 and 2002. Some would argue that a healthy amount of resistance is desirable in a 
democracy, but does the Charter provide an avenue for citizens to express their resistance 
or is it a way for a tax authority to ‘paper over’ the resistance that exists? Second, the 
findings raise the question of how can Charter ratings be interpreted in a meaningful way 
by the tax authority as well as by citizens. Third, the analysis of Charter ratings has 
unexpectedly drawn attention to the absence of a strategy for managing dissociation, a 
mindset that has been aligned with non-compliance, not only in the field of taxation but 
also in other fields (Braithwaite et al., 1994). The remainder of this paper deals with each 
of these implications in turn.  
 
The first derives from a not uncommon argument that Charter ratings are ‘feel good’ 
indicators that lead to uncritical appraisal of a tax authority’s performance. In other words, 
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they distract attention from the main game of critical policy analysis and development. It is 
important to acknowledge the dangers for democratic governance of community 
acquiescence acquired via ‘blind’ trust and cultivated through ‘nice treatment.’ Citizens 
need to have a critical capacity, willingness to express displeasure and a vehicle for doing 
so to ensure that a tax authority can be responsive to democratic will. Responsiveness on 
the part of the tax authority and its citizens is a critical part of building and maintaining 
integrity. 
 
While bearing in mind limitations on generalisability, comparison of Charter ratings in 
2000 with 2001-2 reveals that the community has the capacity to signal increased 
resistance in response to what they see as poor tax administration and policy. This is not to 
say that the tax authority must agree with citizen’s perceptions that they have been treated 
unjustly, or accused wrongly, or subjected to poorly conceived reforms. In the case of 
Australia’s mass marketed schemes, for instance, the tax authority did not agree with many 
of the criticisms that were levelled against it (Fitzpatrick, 2003). The Charter is not the 
arbiter of who is right, but rather is the messenger of discontent. It is up to the tax authority 
to find the appropriate process for understanding and resolving the discontent. Community 
ratings on the Charter represent the first step in the process whereby the tax authority can 
be responsive to the community – either through explaining its position better or changing 
its position on issues that have caused public concern. In other words, the tax authority has 
information to allow it to regulate one aspect of its integrity. 
 
But is this information marginal to integrity? It is on this question that we return to the 
multiple determinants of Charter ratings. Charter ratings reflect primarily the quality of 
the relationship between taxpayer and tax authority, as they should. But this is not all they 
reflect, and for this reason, there are brakes on the capacity of an authority to manipulate 
public perceptions with a bit of ‘spin’ and a ‘feel good’ message. Charter ratings are 
moderated by some hard edge considerations that overlap with the integrity domain – the 
favourability of outcomes (distributive justice), the delivery of public services (purpose of 
taxation), and the probability of being caught (enforcement effectiveness). This means that 
if Charter ratings change, tax administrators must be mindful of events that go beyond 
service delivery.  
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For practical purposes, taking a broader perspective on interpreting Charter ratings is 
desirable. Tax systems are complex, both in law and administration, and their coordination 
into a meaningful and integrated whole is a challenge. If tax authorities are not attuned to 
how the public regard their overall integrity and focus instead on one stovepipe within the 
institution (that is, service delivery), the consequence is likely to be less efficiency and 
effectiveness in the tax system. The finding that Charter ratings are shaped by factors that 
extend beyond the domain of service delivery and rights recognition, therefore, pushes 
self-analysis by the tax authority to a higher level of administrative responsibility. This 
makes Charter ratings more, not less, substantial indicators of Tax Office performance, if 
the objective is continuous improvement in the tax system. 
 
The second implication of the findings of this paper is largely methodological and relates 
to how tax administrations that wish to rely on their Charter ratings to assess their 
performance might take account of external determinants. First, the obvious point is that 
stable irrelevant determinants of Charter ratings can be controlled for interpretative 
purposes through using a baseline. Change in Charter ratings, rather than absolute values, 
becomes the yardstick of improved or deteriorating performance. But what about unstable 
characteristics, in particular those that relate to broader issues than service delivery, most 
specifically, integrity? How can we take account of public complaints about tax inequities, 
for example, tax loopholes for the rich but not the poor? One approach is to measure 
integrity as well as Charter ratings so that the source of community discontent can be 
teased out of the data through statistical analyses. For example, if the focus of the present 
paper had been on a full set of integrity measures, we could have ascertained how much of 
the variation in cooperation-resistance and dissociation was explained by failures of 
integrity and how much was explained by failures of service delivery. The Charter ratings 
provide valuable information, even if their interpretation requires a deeper analysis of the 
data. 
 
From an administrative perspective, the third implication of the findings is the most 
significant and arises from dissociation having little to do with how people perceive the tax 
authority performing on the Charter. When people cut themselves off from the tax 
authority and refuse to engage with the authority on its terms, Charter performance will do 
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little to improve the situation. The importance of this finding is that it forces recognition 
that management of taxpayers is vitally important and requires a sophisticated 
understanding of where community hopes and fears lie with regard to the tax system. Good 
governance involves responsiveness at two levels – responsiveness to resistance and 
responsiveness to dissociation. Resistance is a familiar type of defiance that responds to 
fair and reasonable treatment (Tyler, 1997). Dissociation is a different form of defiance 
and has been virtually ignored across compliance fields with some notable exceptions (see 
McBarnet & Whelan, 1999 on game playing). Data collected in Australia put dissociation 
from the tax system at the 6% mark within the Australian population. The percentage 
remains small, but the question of how a tax authority can manage dissociation to protect 
its revenue base is not inconsequential. 
 
To fully appreciate this finding, the nexus between dissociation, compliance and Charter 
performance needs to be considered. Dissociation is an undesirable state for a tax authority 
because it is linked with both tax avoidance and evasion (Braithwaite, 2003a). Tax 
authorities, therefore, need to be able to manage dissociation. A condition that lies at the 
heart of dissociation is a failure to respect the authority of the Tax Office. Thus, it makes 
sense that offering Charter rights and services is unlikely to be a particularly effective 
regulatory strategy for the dissociated – treatment adds little value, management wise, if 
the system is judged as being fundamentally flawed. Moreover, it is understandable how 
the dissociated may see the Charter as a chink in the armour of the tax authority that 
invites exploitation. Yet clearly, a tax authority has nothing to gain through not treating 
taxpayers decently and not honouring the Charter. Apart from being ethically 
unacceptable, there is an enormous risk that failure to abide by the Charter will jeopardize 
the cooperation that is already in place among most people in the community.  
 
With these considerations in mind, it is worth re-visiting the one Charter principle that 
stands out from the others as being important to those who have dissociated, that is, the tax 
authority respecting the taxpayer’s right to an outside advisor. To deny this right is to fuel 
dissociation. Respecting this right provides some hope for containing dissociation.  
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This finding, while only a small part of the story of dissociation, nevertheless offers a 
possible step forward. Dissociation may lend itself to management through a model of 
meta regulation rather than direct regulation (Grabosky, 1995). A meta regulatory model 
would bring into play an institutional arrangement whereby regulatory responsibilities are 
devolved to a third party, perhaps special tax advisors or mediators, and the primary 
regulator, the tax authority, would then regulate the third party rather than the taxpayer. 
The necessary prerequisite for the third party is to have legitimacy in the eyes of both the 
taxpayer and the Tax Office. The objective of the third party would be to develop a set of 
ground rules for how taxpayer-tax authority transactions could proceed to each party’s 
satisfaction and most importantly, in a way that adds to the integrity of the tax system.  
 
The issue of integrity theoretically is linked to a tax authority’s Charter performance. The 
above findings demonstrate that integrity and Charter performance are empirically linked 
as well. If we take Charter performance out of integrity, we are left with an analysis of the 
purpose of the tax system and the goals and objectives in place to achieve this purpose. As 
we have seen from the data analyses presented here, citizens bring these issues to bear on 
their Charter ratings. Tax authorities also must work toward integrating evaluations of 
Charter performance with deliberations about their goals and purpose that are inclusive of 
the citizenry. 
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Appendix 
 
Statements representing cooperation-resistance and dissociation from Braithwaite, 2001. 
 
Cooperation-resistance 
Paying tax is the right thing to do.  
Paying tax is a responsibility that should be willingly accepted by all Australians. 
I feel a moral obligation to pay my tax. 
Paying my tax ultimately advantages everyone. 
I think of tax paying as helping the government do worthwhile things. 
Overall, I pay my tax with good will. 
I resent paying tax. (reversed) 
I accept responsibility for paying my fair share of tax. 
If you cooperate with the Tax Office, they are likely to be cooperative with you. 
Even if the Tax Office finds that I am doing something wrong, they will respect me in 
the long run as long as I admit my mistakes. 
The Tax Office is encouraging to those who have difficulty meeting their obligations 
through no fault of their own. 
The tax system may not be perfect, but it works well enough for most of us. 
No matter how cooperative or uncooperative the Tax Office is, the best policy is to 
always be cooperative with them. 
If you don’t cooperate with the Tax Office, they will get tough with you. (reversed) 
The Tax Office is more interested in catching you for doing the wrong thing, than 
helping you do the right thing. (reversed) 
It’s important not to let the Tax Office push you around. (reversed) 
It’s impossible to satisfy the Tax Office completely. (reversed) 
Once the Tax Office has you branded as a non-compliant taxpayer, they will never 
change their mind. (reversed) 
As a society, we need more people willing to take a stand against the Tax Office. 
(reversed) 
 
Dissociation 
If I find out that I am not doing what the Tax Office wants, I’m not going to lose any 
sleep over it.  
I personally don’t think that there is much the Tax Office can do to me to make me 
pay tax if I don’t want to.  
I don’t care if I am not doing the right thing by the Tax Office.  
If the Tax Office gets tough with me, I will become uncooperative with them.  
I don’t really know what the Tax Office expects of me and I’m not about to ask. 
I enjoy spending time working out how changes in the tax system will affect me.  
I enjoy talking to friends about loopholes in the tax system.  
I like the game of finding the grey area of tax law.  
I enjoy the challenge of minimising the tax I have to pay.  
The Tax Office respects taxpayers who can give them a run for their money.  
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